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effective foreign policy irreconcilable aims?.

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EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY IRRECONCILABLE
AIMS?

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ARE VIABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND EFFECTIVE
FOREIGN POLICY IRRECONCILABLE AIMS?

By

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/

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May 1, 1963

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THE SMALL DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT AND THE
THEIR POLICY RESPONSIBILITY

W

THE SMALL DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT

Department of Political Science
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Berkeley, California
May 1, 1963

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INTRODUCTION

The question to be answered in this discussion is: "Are viable democratic government and effective foreign policy irreconcilable aims?" The viewpoint of this writer is that they are not irreconcilable aims but insofar as they are reconcilable, the answer is qualified depending on the absoluteness or purity of the attending modifying terms.

This introduction will serve three purposes: first, to define "effective foreign policy" and "viable democratic government" and to establish these definitions as premises in the argument; second, to establish the precincts within which the discussion will be conducted; third, to set forth the format and major divisions of the discussion.

Effective foreign policy in its broadest sense is that foreign policy which contributes directly to those objectives which sustain, enhance, or fortify national interest(s). It generates commitments and emanates from principles within the spectrum of the idealistic absolute good and the "non-perfectionist ethic."¹ In a much narrower sense, effective foreign policy merely contributes in a positive manner to the national interest(s).

Viable democratic government is that government possessed of a system and process that arrives at decisions through debate and peaceful reconciliation of differences in consonance with the majority and in consideration of the rights of the minority.

¹Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), Ch. 4.

Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the findings of the study.

The study was conducted in order to determine the effectiveness of the proposed system.

The results of the study indicate that the proposed system is effective in achieving its objectives.

The study also identified several areas for further research and development.

The findings of the study are discussed in detail in the following sections.

This report is organized as follows: Chapter 1, Introduction; Chapter 2, Literature Review; Chapter 3, Methodology; Chapter 4, Results; Chapter 5, Discussion; Chapter 6, Conclusion.

The study was conducted in accordance with the principles of scientific research.

The data collected during the study were analyzed using statistical methods.

The results of the study are presented in the following tables and figures.

The study was conducted over a period of six months.

The study was conducted in the laboratory setting.

The study was conducted in order to determine the effectiveness of the proposed system.

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The foregoing definitions, as premises of the argument, are complemented by another premise, namely, that national interest(s) does exist. National interest though identified as being too vague, as something intangible, as a device for the undisciplined mind, as a propagandistic tool for furthering unpopular commitments or policies, exists as a scalar measurement of self-preservation, security, and well-being.

In order to set the bounds within which this discussion will be conducted, democratic government and foreign policy will be used in the American context of the terms and, therefore, American democratic government and American foreign policy will be examined.

This writer will use these terms to establish that American foreign policy has been and is effective and that American government has been and is democratic. This writer will examine national interest; bases of foreign policy regarding who makes it and how it is made; democratic government, its characteristics, values and purposes.

"There is no inherent incompatibility between democratic government and success in the sphere of external relations."²

² Max Beloff, Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 25.

NATIONAL INTEREST

The national interest exists and is a fact that cannot be defined out of existence. When a national interest, either because it is felt to be threatened or because a pressure of expectation within a state brings it into sharp focus, becomes sufficiently compelling for a state to seek to establish it with finality by the active exercise of power or influence, it is delimited and particularized for a given context; it becomes an objective.³

An effective foreign policy is one that contributes positively to a national interest. In order to properly dissect and analyze effective foreign policy, the concept of national interest demands clarification. One may begin by saying that a state constantly seeks its own "end-interests," that is to say, a state seeks to guarantee its self-preservation, to fortify its security, and to promote its well-being. These end-interests are national interests and are constants in the equation of variables comprised of commitment, policy and objective. In this context this writer views "objective" as a specific goal deriving from the dictates of a national interest. In order to attain this goal a course of action is formulated and adopted. This then is in essence "policy" and is subsequently supported and furthered by implementing "commitments" which answer the "what" and "when" of policy provided the state has the wherewithal, viz. factors of power, to square national assets vis-a-vis commitments. Impinging on the entire process at all levels of debate and compromise are principles that guide our pattern of behavior and national action--principles conditioned through history, tradition, and societal change (see page 4).

³The Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1954 (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta, 1954), p. 400.

THEORY OF POLICY


The word "policy" is used in a very general sense to denote a course of action or a set of principles which guide the conduct of an individual, a group, or a nation. It is a term which is used in many different contexts, and its meaning is often confused. In this paper, we shall attempt to clarify the meaning of the word "policy" and to show how it is used in different contexts.

In the first place, it is important to distinguish between the use of the word "policy" in the sense of a course of action and the use of the word "policy" in the sense of a set of principles. In the first sense, the word "policy" is used to denote a course of action which is adopted by a group or a nation. In the second sense, the word "policy" is used to denote a set of principles which guide the conduct of an individual, a group, or a nation. In the first sense, the word "policy" is used in a very general sense to denote a course of action which is adopted by a group or a nation. In the second sense, the word "policy" is used to denote a set of principles which guide the conduct of an individual, a group, or a nation. In the first sense, the word "policy" is used in a very general sense to denote a course of action which is adopted by a group or a nation. In the second sense, the word "policy" is used to denote a set of principles which guide the conduct of an individual, a group, or a nation.

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST HIERARCHY

4



Arnold Wolfers describes the national interest as "...the policy designed to promote demands which are ascribed to the nation...the policy that subordinates other interests to those of the nation."⁴ This description is rather thin in that it sets policy and national interest in tantamountcy when it should distinguish policy as a "means" and national interest the "end." The Brookings Institute defines national interest in a more comprehensive manner by stating it to be the

...general and continuing end for which a nation acts to maintain its security and well-being. It embraces such matters as the need of a society for security against aggression, the desirability to a society of developing higher standards of living and the maintenance of favorable conditions of stability both domestically and internationally.⁵

Both descriptions are used here to illustrate the broad interpretation given to national interest. Hans J. Morgenthau set up national interest in terms of power and devotes an entire work to definition and defense of it.⁶ Alexander Hamilton, writing in the *Pacificus Papers*, Number III, and later Disraeli, emphasize the reality of national interest and the paramountcy of its import in the business of foreign affairs.⁷ Henry Wriston writing on one facet of foreign relations, viz. diplomacy, says that national interest is "the interest."⁸

⁴ Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVII (1952), pp. 481-502.

⁵ The Brookings Institution, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-401.

⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Knopf, 1951).

⁷ Benjamin Disraeli, "Speech in the House of Lords on the Berlin Treaty, July 18, 1878" in Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds.), *Principles and Problems of International Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1956), p. 54.

⁸ Henry M. Wriston, *Diplomacy in a Democracy* (New York: Harper Bros., 1956).

In sum then, this writer sees a national interest as a primary end and views the state as an entity whose major concern is with perpetuation, hence self-preservation, security, and well-being. With this view in mind, it can be concluded that these national interests are the primary ends for which our energies in foreign relations are used.

FOREIGN POLICY

General

One of the most critical and continuing problems facing post World War II America is that of foreign policy. Formulation and implementation of an effective and intelligent foreign policy persists as a cornerstone in the survival of our society, and vis-a-vis the Communist world, as a cornerstone in the survival of free society. America has been projected into the international milieu as the free world leader without vying for the responsibility. Our democratic institutions represent the process by which foreign policy evolves, and the rationale upon which our institutions function lends greatly to the substance of our foreign policy. This rationale questions the intelligence, the efficiency, the effectiveness of our foreign policy and it imposes the requirement that our foreign policy reflects the demands of the governed. Foreign policy formation must operate within the context of democratic values and purposes and therefore the issues of foreign affairs must be handled in terms of the organization of our democratic government. Needless to say that in challenging and confronting the pressures and threats from without, care must be exercised so that those values are not destroyed that we are trying to safeguard within: that is to say, the development and establishment of intelligent, efficient and effective foreign policy must not be at the expense of democratic values and institutions.

Charles B. Marshall speaks of foreign policy in terms of courses of action undertaken by a state which occur(s) beyond the span of

THEORY OF THE STATE

THEORY

One of the most important and interesting questions in the theory of the state is the question of the nature of the state.

There are two main views on this question. The first view is that the state is a social organization which is based on force.

The second view is that the state is a social organization which is based on law.

The first view is based on the idea that the state is a social organization which is based on force.

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THEORY OF THE STATE

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THEORY OF THE STATE

jurisdiction of that state.⁹ The course of action can be operable in spheres of economics, technical/technology, cultural, military and/or political. Although it would appear that a course of action in a particular sphere seemingly identifies the objective of the policy, this is not strictly the case. For example, there can be a military policy with an economic objective and vice-versa; in fact, the dynamism of foreign policy does not lend itself to the facile discovery of objectives by an outsider looking in. As a case in point, consider how apparent was the Panama Canal as an ocean thoroughfare and how nonapparent was the canal as an adjunct to the coastline of the United States. As an economic objective, the canal supported "American well-being," a national interest. In 1880, however, President Hayes said, "The policy of this country is a canal under American control...and virtually a part of the coastline of the United States."¹⁰ The objective was then pluralized to include not only economic, but also social, military and political; in short, it was to serve the dual national interests of "security" and "well-being."

As illustrated, policies and objectives do not always identify with each other by their context and by what they purport to attain. This writer has himself reconciled the problem by viewing a policy as "political" when the stated objective becomes secondary to an objective that appears unannounced in the denouement, e.g., the Trojan Horse.

Without probing the depths and multiple meanings of "sovereignty," it seems safe to say that each state exercises freedom to choose policies

⁹ Charles B. Marshall, Department of State Bulletin, March 17, 1952.

¹⁰ Henry M. Wriston, Naval War College Lecture Notes, Sept. 1952.

and objectives and to use them in any combination and by any technique in furtherance of end-interests subject to formal and informal limiting factors of action.


International relations are of two types, competitive and non-competitive. It is from competitive relations that a state recognizes informal limiting factors. These factors, for the most part, force states to adopt policies which maintain an internal balance between capabilities and objectives and an external balance of cooperation and opposition, i.e., no state while pursuing an objective, can materially oppose all states and therefore must cooperate with some while disputing with others.¹¹ When a state oversubscribes to disputing and thus upsets the external balance and exceeds capabilities internally, it (state) must then adjust its foreign policies or suffer defeat either economically, militarily or politically. Informal limiting factors of action are relative with expediency and rationality, the guidelines in the balances of cooperation and opposition, capabilities and objectives. (See page 10.)

The more recognizable but less effective limits on a state's courses of action are those of a formal quality, international organization and international law. International organization is today represented by the United Nations which judges and pronounces on the actions of states, and uses the spectral medium of international opinion as its sounding board. The other formal limiter of foreign policy is international law which prescribes what is acceptable conduct among states. States recognize the existence of formal limits to foreign policy, but the degree of conformity by

¹¹George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), Chapter II.

FOREIGN POLICY - A SCALE

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states varies and many succeed in avoiding the restraints.

Of the two limits to foreign policy, formal and informal, it is to be recognized that informal limits are self-imposed and are more effective. In a state's cost-gain calculus, an objective that will be too expensive can in many cases be ascertained and thus the informal limit has begun to function. Formal limits normally depend on inspection and investigation and usually on some concurrence of opinion before remedial action is attempted. Simply conceived, the United States or any other state for that matter, is more receptive to a self-imposed bar to action evolving through its own decision-making process, than one that is codified, adjudicated or formalized by an external source.

Government

American foreign policy, by its nature and in its formulation and execution is almost a monopoly of the Federal government. One of the major problems in our democracy stems from the conflict between the demands of a democratic people and the expert institutions of government which possess the materials and machinery for making and executing foreign policy. Max Beloff's Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process¹² is devoted to probing this problem. He answers in part with the idea that the vote and public opinion, translating to the government the confidence or censure of the people, are guides by which desires of the people are put forth and by which governmental action will abide--as much as possible. This section will deal with governmental institutions and

¹²Max Beloff, Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process (Baltimore: John's Hopkins Press, 1955).

shown various and being subjected to scrutiny and criticism.

Of the one hand to foreign policy, internal and external, it is

to recognize that internal affairs are self-regulating and are not subject

to a state's own policy in order, as otherwise it will be the responsibility

and to some extent be determined and that for internal affairs the degree

is limited. External affairs are normally determined by international law and

law and usually on some principle of justice and equity and justice is

recognized. Finally, however, the United States is not alone in the

world, it has a reputation as a self-regulating but not a self-regulating country

for its own self-regulating policies, but only this is correct, otherwise

is followed by a national source.

Government

Government policy, by its nature and in its function and

operation is subject to the policy of the United States. One of the

main problems in the United States is the conflict between the

state of a national policy and the state of government.

which is subject to the policy and strategy for which the government is

also policy. The United States policy and the United States policy is

subject to change and change. The system is not the same as

the one and the other, provided in the government the conditions

is subject to the policy, as subject to which subject to the policy

and that is by the government policy will change as well as

operation. The system will not with government operations and

¹ See below, *Foreign Policy and the Domestic Policy*, 1931-1932.
 (New York: Oxford Press, 1931).

public opinion and their relationships to foreign policy.

The President

The President in particular and the executive branch in an overall capacity has primary responsibility for the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations ...there is no more securely established principle of constitutional practice than the exclusive right of the president to be the nation's intermediary in its dealing with other nations. ¹³

From the birth of our republic, the President has been the leader in foreign affairs. His is called, "the world's biggest job."¹⁴ Though the "bigness" cannot be predicated of all leaders in all states, it is customary in almost all states for the executive to assume primary responsibility in the field of foreign policy; so, too, in the United States.

Presidential authority derives from Article II, section 2 of the Constitution in which he is designated Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; with consent of two-thirds of the Senate, he may make treaties with foreign states; with approval of the senate, he may appoint ambassadors. The President has further constitutional authority to receive ambassadors and thereby exercise the power of recognition, He negotiates executive agreements, which in itself attests to his pre-eminence in foreign affairs and foreign policy. Congress has given to the President

¹³ Edwin S. Corwin, The President, Office and Power (New York: New York University Press, 1948), p. 216 and 224.

¹⁴ Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: The New American Library, 1956), frontpiece.

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The Problem

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special grants of power, some of which in order to be effective require the proclaiming of a national emergency; others, like those making up the foreign aid program, are open delegations. Both types of grants imply the trust Congress has in the discretionary power of the President and can be summed up by: "A degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved."¹⁵

The President does not travel a one-way street however. Separation of powers and checks and balances were designed to preclude over control by or the vesting of too much power in any one branch of the government and certainly not in one person. They thereby apply to the executive branch and particularly to the chief executive in that even though he commands the armed forces, only Congress can declare war; even though he appoints ambassadors and negotiates treaties, the Senate must consent to the appointment and the ratification. One point that lies with the President in this entire panorama of balances is his "initiative" without which the Congress or Senate would not have anything to check or balance.

In addition to the powers vested in the President by the Constitution and those granted to him by Congress, he has accrued power in formulating and executing foreign policy by his national image or stature. The whole public and Congress can favor recognition of a foreign state but only the President, one person as the notion of national representation, can extend this recognition. Another power that has accrued to the President is

¹⁵William Hoot, Class Lecture: *United States v. Curtiss Wright*, 299 US 304, U.S. Naval Post Graduate School, February, 1960.

his position as "leading formulator and expounder of Public Opinion in the United States."¹⁶ With this power in firm tow, his is as Woodrow Wilson said:

...his is the only voice in national affairs. Let him once win the admiration and confidence of the country, and no other single force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overcome him, his position takes the imagination of the country.¹⁷

Although Wilson, by example, did not verify his own allegation, his statement remains a good description of the President's posture.

It can then be concluded that the President represents the people nationally and internationally. Consider the names given to many of our past foreign policies: Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt Corollary, Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine. This method of identifying foreign policies with a president uniquely indicates that the policy so named was clearly one of the United States. It further concurs with an earlier allegation of this writer that the chief executive is the prime leader in the field of foreign policy. This follows from the fact that since the United States must act as a single unit in foreign affairs due to our personal concern with our own national interests, and also because the President is our one important policy-maker elected by all the voters. In sum then, while the President is by no means in sole control of foreign policy, he and that part of the executive branch concerned with foreign policy, normally takes the initiative in foreign policy and assumes primary responsibility for effective formation and execution of foreign policy. He bears ultimate responsibility for the decisions and he sets the general policy line: he is the peak of the policy-making mountain.

¹⁶Rossiter, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁷Ibid.

Executive Branch

The multitude of imposing tasks and responsibilities incumbent on the President are distributed with varying degree within the executive branch. The President, at the apex of the foreign policy pyramid, must rely on the counsel, skills, and wisdom of his contemporaries; thus the organization of the executive branch for developing foreign policy takes on extreme importance. The executive branch is in the strategically supreme position to make decisions. It deals directly with other states and is thereby the medium of formal and informal, official and unofficial international contact. The executive branch is the repository of information and intelligence, the employer of experts, and the marshalling point of policy process; i.e., the elements through and upon which foreign policy decisions are made.

Gathered around the President is an elaborate staff organization. The agencies of the staff are of various sizes and depending on the domestic and international climate, are of varying degrees of closeness to him. At this juncture let it be noted that this writer does not submit the following agencies or departments and their functions as definitive or even necessary components in the structure of democratic institutions. Rather, they are here set forth to illustrate what the American consensus views as acceptable. A word about each of the pertinent ones is in order. The white house office operates as the President's personal staff comprised of administrative and personal assistants; aides and secretaries, and a special assistant(s) who may have a functional role in foreign affairs or any designated area similar to President Wilson's Colonel House. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should act as principal military advisor providing the President with strategic recommendations and the military point of view.

Next, the Office of Defense Mobilization has interest and influence in foreign policy through the relationship of overseas aid programs to domestic mobilization. The director is concerned with the material position of the United States and he is adviser to the President on all facets of mobilization except military. The Council of Economic Advisers enlightens and advises the President about the American economy which is of primary importance in foreign policy decision and implementation. The Bureau of the Budget watches the purse and raises or lowers, approves or disapproves, requests for appropriations and therefore is of great import on the substance of policy. The National Security Council with its permanent membership and flexible ingress-egress of pro-tem members, gathers together the most important officials concerned with foreign policy who make recommendations to the President. Finally, the Central Intelligence Agency which is the clearing house for all intelligence data variously gathered by other organizations, etc.

The two departments of the executive branch of government that will be discussed here are the Department of State and Department of Defense. It can be argued that every department and almost every agency, bureau, or division within the executive branch of government has some influence or plays a role in foreign policy. In the past, however, it is the Department of State that has acted as the major source of assistance to the President in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. The Department of State has now ceased to exercise what was once nearly exclusive control of foreign policy: it now serves as the medium of cooperative action.

In 1789 when the office of Secretary of State was established, no detailed responsibilities in foreign affairs were set forth; probably because at that time the American policy was one of isolation and it was viewed that this policy would be viable forever. The Secretary was at that time directed to assist the President as the President directed. This imprecise mandate provided grounds for a problem that has persisted between the two from the beginning, that is the relationship between the President and the Secretary of State. In question form the problem of relationship asks, "To what degree is the President guided in matters of foreign policy?" For example, consider relations between Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull. Hull, as Secretary of State, was accorded great powers in foreign affairs before World War II while the President grappled with domestic issues, but by 1940, the President virtually became his own Secretary of State. Another case in point, though not so pronounced, is that of John Foster Dulles.

There is no hard and fast rule about this relationship, but at all times, the Secretary of State is usually of great if not decisive influence in foreign policy. Even when the President reserves to himself the making of the important decisions on foreign policy, his picture of reality may well be what the Secretary of State supplies him, and a moment's reflection will make obvious that this picture will possibly be more influential in the determination of policy than the predispositions of the President.

As mentioned earlier in this discussion, the Department of State is now a medium of cooperative action. This cooperative action must extend beyond departmental walls for one good reason: The departmental organization is ordered around functions, viz. political, cultural,

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economic, etc., and areas, viz. Western Europe, Latin America, Soviet Union, Africa, etc. Decisions, programs, and policies of anything but the narrowest scope in either field necessarily involve the other plus outside fields for materials of implementation and so forth. If the Department of State can continuously operate and serve the principle of coordinate action, it will have found its niche in the pyramid of foreign policy.

The other department highly concerned and highly influential in foreign policy is the Department of Defense. Since World War II, the continued inclusion of the military viewpoint in foreign policy formulation represents a significant but not unwarranted procedural change.¹⁸ It is manifest that as long as there is a clear threat of military involvement in the international milieu, military consideration in any proposed foreign policy cannot be ignored. The policy itself may evolve to counter a precipitous military incursion allowing for no other feasible course of action. As an aside, it is gratifying to review active military participation as foreign policy since World War II and ascribe to these courses of action political objectives rather than the "legalistic-moralistic" and "punitive" stigmas that G.F. Kennan predicates of military action in the past.¹⁹ The cases to be cited are of course Korea, Lebanon, Cuba and South East Asia. As a final note in this vein, this writer feels that punitive action is not a thing of the past but remains a very real and valid course of action in answer to a wanton act by an aggressor where no other rebuttal will suffice.

¹⁸ Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954).

¹⁹ George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

The Department of Defense is integrated in foreign policy formulation and implementation at all levels of process and has the job of maintaining the military in a position of foreign policy execution on a continuing basis. Secretary of Defense has become a position of augmented power and influence like none other in American history. He has the delegated command of the huge military budget and his reconciliation of problems and decisions inject into many facets of foreign policy formulation and implementation. This has been a changing role toward more responsibility and more decision-making capability, but it must be realized that his role in the foreign policy process and his decisions in the field of foreign affairs are with the sanction of the President who extends the power through delegation and the Congress which extends the power through appropriation.

As a finale to this discussion of the executive branch of government, it is this writer's opinion that the President is the only person who can make and ultimately be held accountable for foreign policy. It is to be realized that all men in position of responsibility and trust (and scores of them low in the hierarchy) make decisions, but the authority is derived from the President who alone is accountable. Harry Truman made a statement about the National Security Council regarding decisions and policy which is felt to be applicable to all departments, bureaus, and agencies; to all men in the executive branch less the President:

Policy itself has to come down from the President, as all final decisions have to be made by him. A vote in the National Security Council is merely a procedural step. It never decides policy. That can be done only with the President's approval.²⁰

²⁰ Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 59.

Congress

The Congress of the United States has moved from a secondary position in the field of foreign policy to one of major importance. This is a challenging statement and should be covered by the qualification that since foreign policy has come to take up so much of our mass media and mass monies, Congress has moved along and into the spotlight as the "keeper of the purse." This is not to imply equality with the executive branch in foreign policy but it means that those powers at Congressional disposal in foreign policy have been sharpened and toned to meet the continuing demands of the awakening democratic public on one hand and the crucially important field of foreign policy on the other. Conceptually stated, Congress' role in foreign policy is one of reaction whereby it amends, negates, or passes those policy decisions already taken by the President.

As a body of reflection and debate, Congress necessarily moves slowly weighing the opinions of its individual members, its specially or regularly constituted committees, and public opinion for which congressmen claim to have an acute sensitivity. Operation of our system of checks and balances and the lack of any clear procedure for initiative in foreign policy have made Congress the reactive body it is and have further forced Congress into a position of watchdog on the executive branch.

Congressional power derives from the Constitution in confirmation and consent, legislation and appropriation. This power is manifested through Congressional action on American programs of military and economic aid, money appropriations, and treaty reconciliations.

Money appropriations represent the greatest participation by

Congress in foreign affairs. The legal basis or authorization for the expenditure is the first step followed by the actual appropriation which provides funds for implementing the authorization. Besides both houses individually, the foreign relations committees and appropriations committees of the houses have primary interest in appropriations wherein the foreign relations committees consider the substance of the policy and the appropriations committees consider the money request per se. This activity supports an intracongressional check system in that policy substance is investigated and funding is weighed against domestic needs, national debt, and borrowing capabilities. In short, comprehensive purse control gives Congress its most formidable incursive power in formulation of foreign policy. It should be noted that Congressmen are desirous of political, economic and military success in foreign affairs and therefore in these affairs must be presumed to act in the country's best interests.

Before a foreign policy can be carried out, there is normally the requirement for legislation. This is the second important area of participation and is on a more vis-a-vis basis with foreign policy than is funding. Congress negates, passes or amends the bill that delineates the policy. In the case of amendment the policy reverts to the executive for action. In order to plumb Congressional feeling and predisposition on policy, the executive branch maintains a liason, usually in the character of a special assistant who sets out the proposition and whose prime mission is one of cooperation if possible, information at least. Small scale executive-legislative consultations also have a role in liason with like goals.

The third and final major area of participation is the Senate's

constitutional power to approve treaties with two-thirds concurrence and to confirm executive appointments which includes the entire foreign service officer corps and executive cabinet. Disapproval of a treaty in essence constitutes a veto and renders void a project of no small expense and concern. In order to permit speed and secrecy, the President has been granted special power to engage in executive agreements with foreign states as already mentioned in this discussion.

It hardly seems necessary to emphasize the importance of the foregoing powers in foreign policy. Congress plays the part of the honest broker, the taskmaster, the watchdog. It forces the executive branch to constantly review budgetary designs not only in those areas clearly marked foreign policy, but also in areas of indirect contributions to foreign policy and in the military, our court of last resort in foreign policy. Investigative power has sharpened the focus of Congressmen as participants in foreign policy and has trimmed away much of the mystery that attended previous informational shortcomings. Finally, the congressional resolution answers the chief executive in terms of Congress' predisposition and public opinion regarding any proposition, in this case specifically foreign policy, e.g., Vandenberg Resolution, 1949.

Public Opinion

Bryce said: "Public opinion is commonly used to denote the aggregate of views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the community."²¹ These "matters" then include foreign affairs and thereto,

²¹James Bryce in Public Opinion and Propaganda, D. Katz, D. Cartwright, S. Eldersveld, A. McClung Lee (eds.) (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), p. 50.


foreign policy. The questions that naturally arise are, "which men in particular and what affect have these aggregate views?"

In answer to these questions, one must consider the stratification of our citizenry. James Rosenau delineates his idea of the stratified public as the mass public, or Gabriel Almond's general public, the middle stratum attentive public and the opinion-making public²² which Almond

calls "elites."²³ The illustration

at right is also Almond's conception adapted to visual reference.

The Mass Public is "75 to 90 per cent of the adult population"²⁴ which has no opportunity or desire to enter or affect the decision and policy-making process. This group has opinion but not that structured opinion evolving from an evaluative process.



STRATIFICATION of THE PUBLIC

²²James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 33-34.

²³Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1961), Chapter 5.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 138-139.

"Their response of foreign policy matters is less one of intellect and more one of emotion; less one of opinion and more one of mood, of generalized superficial, and undisciplined feelings which easily fluctuate from one extreme to another...."²⁵ This writer in general agrees with Roseman's allegations but finds one point deserving of comment. The percentage figures for the mass public are very close to those used by Martin Kriesberg in 1948.²⁶ The frightening aspect is the implication that since 1948, the great advances in communications and mass media have failed to enlighten an appreciable portion of what is called the "Mass Public." This writer does not concede the point.

The second stratum is that of the Attentive Public: those opinion holders who would participate but are lacking in technical access and opportunity. If it can be said that the mass public sets the precincts within which foreign policy will operate, the attentive public evaluates foreign affairs based on informational data and evaluates the substance of foreign policy. Participation from this stratum is that of opinion presentation in the form of letters, petitions, meetings, etc. Because theirs is opinion based on evaluation and reason as opposed to emotion (though they are not free of emotion nor is anyone else), they temper the moods created by the mass public. Their letters and communications in general are valid indications to the decision maker that his choice of foreign policy is impinging on the enlightened and has not peremptorily wakened the slumbering giant, the mass public.

²⁶ Martin Kriesberg, "Dark Areas of Ignorance" in Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, L. Market (ed.) (New York: Harper and Bros. 1949), p. 51.

²⁵ Rosenau, op. cit., p. 35.

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The opinion-making public is the upper stratum of the pyramid. It influences through respective societal positions the other two strata either by local or national participation. Opinion makers are not necessarily decision makers, as in the case of professors and writers, but they can be, as in the case of Congressmen and officers of the Executive Branch.

The President and Congressmen as opinion-makers, decision-makers, policy-makers, are the two most sensitive, yet effective positions in the foreign policy-democratic government complex of problems. They, the President in particular, on a national scale, reach out to all strata of the public via mass media--speeches, publications, etc.--and submit policy in terms of objectives that will stimulate support or at least acceptance. This is the first step in a four step process of public opinion. It is then the goal that other opinion makers will give their strategic support and thus proliferate policy dissemination. The attentive public will evaluate the policy and will further act as conveyors to the mass public which will have been exposed to multiple stimulations.²⁷ The mass public variously tests the policy and by its reaction sets a mood which is the heart and soul of public opinion poles, advertising, man-on-the-street interviews and also the acceptability or not of a foreign policy as the answer for which the administration wants support or at least information. It is to be noted that a neat four-step process, distinguishable at each juncture, assessible in each strata, is not always the case. Rather, the process is likened to spontaneous combustion wherein the original introduction of the

²⁷ Idea adapted from the four-step flow. Rosenau, op. cit., p. 8.

situation is reflected by an immediate mood of the mass public followed by the reinforcements of other opinion makers and articulation by the attentive public--all in a very short, almost immediate period of time. We have Pearl Harbor to illustrate the spontaneity of immediate mood, reinforcement, articulation, and sustaining mood, wherein all stratum were concurrent in accepting or rather demanding war as a course of action. It is at this writing, inconceivable that even if Pearl Harbor had been a gross mistake followed by apologies et al., that the mood of the mass public would have permitted any other foreign policy but war. Similarly, though not as personal, and extending over a longer period of time was the process by which President McKinley acquiesced to a war with Spain. The mass public was conditioned and finally reacted to the U.S.S. Maine incident. A final example is that of President Roosevelt's emasculation of the Neutrality Acts, one of Congress' most apparent ventures into foreign policy "initiative." There are many more: President Truman and Korea; President Kennedy and Cuba which, from this writer's viewpoint, may become a classic in foreign policy strategy at least in preparation and initial presentation to the public.

In reconsidering Bryce's definition, a final note is in order. The aggregate view(s) are a product of conditioning, timing, and presentation; of impingement by prejudice, bias, and ignorance; of reconciliation by mood, interest, and cognitive evaluation. This occurs first down and then back up the strata of our society and finally emerges as a force, a democratic force in foreign policy. "I can do anything with Public Opinion, but nothing without it or against it."²⁸

²⁸ Abraham Lincoln from Rossiter, op. cit., p. 48.

The first of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. The second is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. The third is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. The fourth is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. The fifth is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. The sixth is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. The seventh is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. The eighth is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. The ninth is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. The tenth is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood.

In external policies as at home, the fundamentals of foreign policy are determined by public opinion, by the set of pre-suppositions, partly conscious and partly unconscious, with which Congress and President alike must reckon at every moment of the decision making process.²⁹

²⁹ Max Beloff, "Foundations of American Policy" in The Spectator, #194, February 25, 1955.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political--legislative and administrative-- decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions. And this must be the starting point of any attempt at defining it.³⁰

Thus far this writer has set before the reader foreign policy, the institutions and men of American government who make foreign policy, and the public opinion that affects foreign policy. In this chapter the goal is to advance the concept that ours is a democratic government by examining ideas and results and ascertaining whether or not these ideas and products ascribe to our government. This is then a grammar of fundamentals, because it is in fundamentals, both in interpretation and application, that one form of government differs from another. It is in searching the fundamentals that we discover why our democratic government has sustained and will continue to.

In order to discuss government, democratic government in particular, one must use some plane of reference. Governmental and political systems are never mutually exclusive nor are they isolated as pure types. For purposes of analysis then, one can conceive a qualitative spectrum of governments using as the common denominator, control of the citizenry. At one end of the spectrum is the totalitarian government wherein control is exercised over every facet of a citizen's being: complete domination. At the other end of the spectrum should therefore be a government exercising

³⁰J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 220.

least control, on the order of Jefferson's "...Government that governs least, governs best." Since he was talking democratic government, let us say that antipodal to totalitarianism is popularly elected democratic government. The ideal of this type of government is Athenian democracy which is constantly used as a qualitative measure of democracies but which, to this writer, is a false standard of excellence considering that Athenian "rule by the people" meant adult male citizens comprising a small proportion of a small population in a small state. It was said:

No people of a magnitude to be called a nation has ever, in strictness, governed itself; the utmost which appears to be attainable under the conditions of human life, is that it should choose its governors and that it should on select occasions bear directly on their action.³¹

What this writer wishes to establish at this juncture is that the existence of democracy in any system is one of degree. It is a subjective quality wherein states' governments appropriate the name because it is honorific and persuasive, because it arouses favorable feelings and in many states is a veneer to a despicable base. In the spectrum, once again, one can place relatively, the government of every extant state. It is surprising how many ascribe to the democratic label: China calls itself Centralized Democracy; the Soviet Union as do the states of Eastern Europe call themselves People's Democracies; historically, Hitler called Germany Real Democracy, and Mussolini naturally said that Italy was an organized, centralized, authoritarian Democracy.

If, in this tyranny of words, one can say that a Democracy has democratic government, then this writer dares to say that the United States

³¹ Michael Goodwin (ed.), 19th Century Opinion cited in An Introduction to Democratic Theory, H.B. Mayo (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 59.

is a Democracy having democratic government: that the citizens of this democratic government choose their governors and judge them at each election and therefore designate what kind of democratic government it is to be in order to meet the needs of the time and attending circumstances.

What then in generic terms distinguishes a truly democratic government from others? It is

...one that is marked by many popular disagreements and disputes about policies, where all policies are made in a context of political freedoms, and where the final decisions of government are made by representatives freely elected on a wide, usually universal, suffrage....It is the most political of all systems, in that disputes are open and continuous, going on between elections as well as during campaigns, and often being settled for the time being without reference to the arbitrament of law.³²

To this writer, the above quote represents a thumbnail sketch of the American democratic system. Let us look at the ideas that sustain our system.

Political equality is one of the ideas. It is made manifest by the equality of all adult citizens in voting wherein every adult citizen has the vote, or at least the federal government is taking steps to ensure this to be and each singular vote from each individual counts equally. This idea is one that is common to Athenian and modern democratic governments except that the one democracy today, used by critics of the American form in terms of comparison, does not subscribe to female suffrage. This is of course only one criterion whereby one state may rate higher than others but it is one that sustains in the American form and is constantly being improved.

³² Mayo, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

A natural concomitant to the vote is popular control of the policy makers without which the "vote" would be near meaningless. The institutional embodiment of this idea is the election whereby representatives who would be policy makers are freely chosen. These then become the government and counterpoised to them are those anxious to replace: both are sensitive to public opinion; both operate with a wide range of political freedoms through which the public exerts continuing influence as well as distinct periodic control. The normative reason for popular control is simply that political authority should emanate from the people rather than from another political source.

In company with the foregoing ideas is that the decision of the majority prevails. It is recognized as substance from the vote, where the majority chooses, and from popular control which bespeaks consent of the governed in majority. The basis for this idea is Aristotelian in that the majority is more likely to be right or in a modern context, "Democracy is the recurrent suspicion that more than half of the people are right more than half of the time."³³ It must be conceded that the "majority" idea is not absolute or without fault and by that same token, neither are the ideas of the "vote" or "popular control." Their shortcomings are readily apparent inasmuch as voting in some areas is reluctantly allowed and if possible disallowed; "popular control" is sometimes marginal, if at all, when public interest and resultant public opinion are dormant, most conspicuously in our relations with other nations; majority decisions do prevail but they are not always met and just because out of context they need only be so "more than half the time."

³³ Ibid., p. 175.

Along with the foregoing ideas evolve institutional mechanisms of democratic government in the form of the political party, and defined by Burke as, "...a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interests, upon some particular principle on which they are all agreed."³⁴ Our very early history documents the antipathy for political parties but with extension of the franchise and political freedoms, political parties were born, grew, and are recognized as valuable and necessary in the democratic scheme of government: "...experience gives no ground for believing that we can have political democracy at the a national level without at least two parties."³⁵ Because we are a government that weighs and reckons with opinion and because our electorate demands organization for articulation and vocalization of its desires, political parties sustain. In simplest terms, parties gather the votes, but oversimplification does an injustice to parties per se as it does to other descriptives like "government of the people," "universal franchise" and obviously "democracy."

Parties, in pursuing their functions, contribute to democratic government in that they afford the voter a choice of political programs, they stimulate and help evoke a popular will, they help to determine the outcome of policy making. The great many opinions that pervade our national scene either through mood, emotion, interest, or cognitive evaluation would never amalgamate into a focalized two-opinion camp if parties did not set forth platforms by which the majority within our societal strata might

³⁴ Edmund Burke cited in The People and the Constitution by C.S. Emden (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 121.

³⁵ Mayo, op. cit., p. 147.

personally identify. More mundane functions of political parties include presentation of candidates, political education of the public, opposition to the present government through criticism and debate, and preparation of counterpoised representatives for the respective election year(s).

The existence of political opposition--by individuals and groups, by the press, and above all, by organized parties--is the litmus-paper test of democracy....One can take the trimmings of democracy, especially the voting and popular support, but the opposition of party, press, etc., cannot be faked.³⁶

Concluding these comments, it can be said that, "Democratic government is party government and parties help to keep the government democratic."³⁷

The implemented ideas of a democratic government and the mechanisms of a democracy can be placed into a mosaic of the over-all scheme. Parties set out the programs or platforms of the candidates; a free election is conducted in which chosen candidates become representatives of the people; as representatives, they make decisions and formulate policy tempered by the political freedoms of the people and criticism and opposition of the counterpoised candidates; the result is a popularly elected democratic government subject to electorate control.

Relating to Democracy alone, but for purposes of this writer, equally attributable to democratic government, Schumpeter's earlier quotation in part said, "...incapable of being an end in itself."³⁸ Regarding democratic government then, it, like a machine or process, must have an end product justifiable by terms of its cost and energies of operation. History is a documentation of cost both in men, money and materials. The energies

³⁶ Suzanne Labin, The Secret of Democracy, cited in Mayo, op. cit., p. 147.

³⁷ Mayo, op. cit., p. 148.

³⁸ Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 220.

of operation can be viewed by looking around one's self today and calculating the man-hours devoted to the operation of government. These are material results. Let us consider the results as statements of value.³⁹

In our society as in all others, conflicts germinate and are transported by opinions, interests or moods. We look at these conflicts as legitimate and purposive and thusly we look to negotiation, mediation but not to intimidation or force (for the most part) to reconcile them. This is then, the voluntary adjustment of disputes.

Peaceful change in a changing society does not seem to apply when one views integration problems on the national scene and threatened war on the international scene. When one accepts civil rights as only a singular aspect of our changing society and reckons that we make big of our shortcomings and little of our advances and if we isolate the problem and particularize the participants, it is a thorn in the eagle's foot, painful but by no means debilitating. Internationally we are a nation of once removed isolationists. Our walls bristle with guns, the largest armory in our country's history. Yet, history tells its own story of a nation that has needed violent shoves and violent stimulation to be forced to turn to the sword and shield. It is incontrovertible that the United States has, does, and will go to great lengths to settle differences short of war. Our's is an era of great social change and history twenty years or a hundred years from now will be the final judge of our disposition for peaceful change, success or failure.

³⁹The values used in this section are adopted from Mayo, op. cit., pp. 218-278.

One of the outstanding facets of American democracy is its orderly succession of rulers. Our state presides over peaceful reconciliation of conflicts and grapples to further peaceful societal change but it has seemingly solved the problem of the orderly succession of rulers. Discussing free elections and orderly succession, a resultant, Judge Learned Hand wrote:

It seems to me, with all its defects, our system does just that. For abuse it as you will, it gives a bloodless measure of social forces...a means of continuity, a principle of stability, a relief from the paralyzing terror of revolution.⁴⁰

Because the majority vote (at least) is the method by which legislation, much of policy, and decisions in general are reached, and because legislation on a national scale pertains to the majority in general, one can question the position of the minority. Can the minority be construed as being coerced? In answer it can be alleged that even those who are favored by legislation, for the most part, do not receive everything desired. This in itself represents a rejection or a defeat of sorts. Other defeats, particularly in elections accompanied by campaigns, are mollified through a win-lose calculus. Those identifying with a party recognize the contest character of the election and recognize that they had put their best foot forward but did not succeed. In essence, the acceptance of political defeat by principals, and acceptance of legislation as binding is an identifying feature of political discipline, responsibility or willing obedience.

The final resultant of our democratic government and what might rightly be called a virtue is the attainment of justice. Each day it is apparent that justice is high on our scale of values. The democratic system

⁴⁰ Learned Hand, *The Spirit of Liberty* cited in Mayo, op. cit., p. 222.

does not in all cases preclude injustice from occurring, but rather recognizes it as such and attempts to prevent its recurrence. This is accomplished for the most part by established procedural safeguards institutionalized in our court and law enforcement system. Further, injustice is less likely to occur in our milieu because political freedoms are not suppressed. Finally, political compromise by adjustment of conflicting claims greatly reduces the areas where injustice could occur because the absoluteness of right or wrong is modified by reconciliation of the problem. Abraham Lincoln summed up the attainment of justice in a few short words. It also touches on other aspects of democratic government: majority principle, good governors, representative government and government of the people, by the people and for the people: "...faith in the ultimate justice of the people."⁴¹

⁴¹Abraham Lincoln cited in Mayo, op. cit., p. 230.

CONCLUSION

Restated, the question to have been answered is, "Are viable democratic government and effective foreign policy irreconcilable aims? In the American context of the question, this writer is of the opinion that we have both effective foreign policy and viable democratic government.

Initially this writer discussed the definition of foreign policy, i.e., what it is, and discussed it in relation to its co-actors as they apply to the maintenance and furtherance of our national interests. It has been shown that foreign policy, its formulation and implementation, results from democratic process in our institutions; that those who formulate foreign policy are subject to the healthy "checks and balances" pressures causing careful evaluation of the course of action in terms of internal and external needs. The President has been discussed as the prime initiator in the foreign policy process. The Executive branch completes this phase by answering for him, "Can we do it?" (i.e., feasibility), and "Will it accomplish what is desired?" (i.e., suitability). However, it is the chief executive who makes the final decision and bears ultimate responsibility for success or failure. Congress operates as the watchdog on foreign policy in normal foreign relations, by assuring, through control of the purse, that our external commitments do not endanger or bankrupt our national capabilities. Both the President and Congress function on the bases established in the Constitution but interpretation of the needs of the time have stimulated the accordence of extra powers to the President. This delegation of powers to the President by Congress helps us to ascertain the viability of our

[illegible]

democratic government because it indicates that we have not stagnated, that we have shown a willingness to change when change is in order, reluctantly and guardedly, but positively. Finally, in this section was discussed public opinion, its evolution in both the mass public stratum and opinion-making stratum and its travels both up and down the public opinion pyramid. The quintessence of this discussion of public opinion is that the aggregate view or opinion is not a product of any one strata but is synthesized from all three. The mass public manifests itself as a mood which sets the precincts within which courses of action may operate as acceptable. The mood is important because it indicates how the public will receive foreign policy and therefore bears heavily on the disposition Congress assumes in appropriation considerations. In foreign policy matters, the President prepares the mass and attentive public by many devices, primarily mass media, makes a pronouncement, and waits for the reaction. It is this reaction as an aggregate view that is the public opinion and exerts itself on foreign policy.

It was alleged that democratic government, democracy in a more comprehensive sense, is relativistic and subjective. There are ideas that underlay a government claiming democratic status and those ideas are part of the rationale of American government. From democratic government come resultants that indicate the degree of democracy attained. Viability can be ascribed to that democratic government that encourages and provides an environment where the resultants can be improved; a government that does not stagnate. This is the American government.

It cannot be asserted that effective foreign policies have always been formulated and executed. The follies of the years following World

War I, leading to the great depression and allowing Fascism-Naziism, attest to this fact. This does not prove the case against viable democratic government and effective foreign policy. For one thing, there is no guarantee that had the Central Powers won the war they would have chosen wiser courses of action and certainly the world would not have been better for it. Our policy of war was effective but our subsequent policy of peace was not.

When reviewing American foreign policy, one cannot help but be struck by the fact that every major course of action in foreign affairs has been criticized, and each age has considered itself as one beset by crises on the international scene. Yet, our major foreign policies have served their purpose: isolationism served this nation in its early, weak years and permitted prodigious advance and expansionism served by augmenting this nation's size threefold.

Now we are faced with great responsibilities of international character. Since 1949 this nation has accepted an outlook of internationalism and has progressed from adolescence to adulthood. There have been setbacks and there have been regressions but this government of one hundred and eighty years will continue to provide the sustaining guidance in foreign affairs.

He (Bryce) did not accept the view that democracies were by their nature incapable of generating an intelligent and realistic view of where their interests lay or that they were incapable of holding fast to a consistent line of policy. He believed that the contrary could be demonstrated ...by the record of the United States....⁴²

⁴²Beloff, op. cit., p. 32.

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
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